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ABSTRACT
BRANDI N. DAVIS: The Bolivian Press and the Fight for a Revolution
(Under the direction of Joe Atkins)

The role of the press and journalism as a whole can be varied. The press covers
hard news such as crime and politics, and it features stories that highlight notable people
and places. There are usually newspaper sections for sports, business and entertainment
as well. I wanted to look at a press system that operated outside of these American
norms. What would the newspaper look like? What kind of events would it cover? The
1952 Bolivian National Revolution was an instance of a revolutionary press whose
purpose was not to uphold the norms of the time but to bring about change.
The press system of the revolutionary movement was not one in the traditional
sense. It was run by the revolutionary MNR party who opposed the frequent,
conservative military regimes that governed Bolivia. The party s belief was that its
movement would build true nationalism in Bolivia. Its goal was to reach the middle and
lower-class citizens who had not seen their interests represented in the press. The poor
Indians and laborers composed a majority of the population, and their support would
make a strong foundation for the party. To convince citizens to join its cause, the party
made sure to emphasis in its newspapers how the government’s actions would impact
them negatively.

Ill

Although the purpose of the revolutionary press may be different from the
established press, its standards are still very similar. Timeliness and relevance are crucial
to attracting readers and having them support the message. Presenting a clear, concise
message is also important. When the message is clear, it ensures that revolutionary
citizens and politicians know the goals they are fighting to reach. The MNR was
successful at these but failed in other areas. Lack of representation for Indians plagued
the newspapers, and true freedom of the press did not exist under the MNR government.
The MNR’s press system was vital to helping the party obtain power. In the end,
however, the limited freedom of the press was one area that demonstrated that the MNR
regime was not a true, sustainable democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

Like many countries in Latin America, Bolivia’s long history of colonialism has
reverberations that still affect many aspects of the country’s society even in the 2U‘
Century. This presence is felt even in Bolivia’s current media system. The region today
known as the Republic of Bolivia was under the Spanish colonial rule that began in the
early 1500s. Under this system newspapers were produced solely to benefit the Spanish
empire. Even after Bolivia won its independence in 1825, newspapers were still the
official voices of the state, controlled by the government in place at the time. The
restraints put on the Bolivian media helped foster problems that still face the country
today, including concerns about the level of government control, censorship and danger
for journalists. Racial tension is another contentious issue that persists.
Bolivia’s indigenous majority is often at a disadvantage in its country, both
socially and economically. Bolivia is considered one of South America s poorest
countries, possibly the poorest of all. Unfortunately, indigenous citizens often suffer the
effects of poverty more than their European-descended counterparts. Poverty affects the
media as well. The country’s literacy rate is about eighty-three percent. Whereas most
of the country’s newspapers are published in the capital city of La Paz, many indigenous
people live in the Altiplano, the valley between the Andean mountains, and other remote
areas where they have little access to newspapers. Overall circulation of Bolivia’s
eighteen newspapers is about fifty-five readers per 1,000.' An integral purpose of the
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print media is not being met since a significant portion of the population does not have
the opportunity to adequately inform itself. The political ramifications of this social
divide are a continuous problem dating back to the early part of the 20*^ century. Despite
being a country with unlimited access to the many natural resources within its borders,
Bolivia was unable to capitalize on this potential for industrial development. The single
most prosperous industry was in mining tin, and even that endeavor was inefficient. The
indigenous people suffered most in the labor to extract this precious metal. Although
technically no longer a Spanish colony, Bolivia still lived under a clear hierarchy. The
indigenous people worked under the Spanish latifundio owners in a feudal-like system.
Then,just as now,indigenous people suffered disproportionately from diseases, illiteracy
and other ailments.
Two monumental events occurred in relatively short time and became turning
points in how the country’s people related to each other and how the governing system
operated. The first was the economic depression that affected not only Bolivia but also
the world following World War I. The highest level of exports of tin and other minerals
came during the period of 1916 to 1920 as a result of the war. Between 1900 and 1930
the value of exports also reached its highest price per ton.^ Between 1926 and 1929
Bolivia’s government faced increasing budget deficits and difficulty in paying
international debts. This coincided with the peak and then significant decline of tin
prices in the international market.^ The country’s economy had been in decline for some
years, but 1933 marked the undeniable presence of a depression as the price in tin
dropped as well as the demand for Bolivia’s exports. By this time exports by the ton had
decreased by half of their 1927 levels. Although production rose during the second
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World War, exports never again reached pre-depression levels."^ There was another
significant event that compounded Bolivia’s economic woes. In 1932 a three-year
conflict broke out between Bolivia and its neighbor to the southeast, Paraguay, that was
called the Chaco War. The two landlocked countries wanted to expand their territory as
well as gain access to water supplies by controlling an area of land along their border
known as the Chaco Boreal.*^ Oil reserves were also thought to be in this area, which
brought in the influence of both American and British oil companies to fuel the war
behind the scenes. Though oil rights concerns were part of the motivation behind the
fighting and became galvanizing issues for reform in the post-war years, others believe
there were other causes at the foundation of the wai‘. Bolivian President Daniel
Salamanca used “aggressive military exploration and settlement policies” in an effort to
relieve social tensions resulting from the depression. However, the initial steps of road
construction and building forts led to direct military combat.^ Map T below shows the
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disputed territory as well as the militaries’ strategies of fort building and troop
advancement.
The country’s citizens were ambivalent about the war as a whole, yet many
indigenous people were forced into military servitude by their bosses and landowners.
High-ranking officials were seen by the peasants as greedy, irresponsible warmongers
who “showed up only for the cocktail hour.” By the end of the conflict in 1935, Bolivia
had lost the war, the disputed territory, 60,000 of its soldiers, and $50 million. Bolivia s
per capita fatalities rivaled those of Europe’s in World War I. A significant majority of
those killed and wounded were Aymara and Quechua Indians as well as peasants.
Residual anger over the war and the growing national deficit and inflationary spiral
created a political instability that was fertile ground for a social revolution.
The revolution that took place in Bolivia in 1952 was a result of a complex set of
circumstances within the country dating back to these earlier events. Those controlling
the government had badly mishandled a war while neglecting their responsibilities and
minimizing their culpability. The economic consequences of their decisions
compounded the country’s many problems, causing the country’s people to suffer greatly.
Discontent plagued those of the middle and lower classes as they were subject to the rule
of the wealthy, including the corrupt owners of the lands and mines where they worked
tirelessly for a minimal living wage and without the opportunity to be in control of their
own land. Those ready for drastic change added these reasons to the discontent over
other social ills, such as the plight of the indigenous and the outrageous influence of the
country’s large companies over the press and the mining industry.
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Many of the revolutionaries were ready for a literal fight, but the first step to this
drastic action was to learn to fight through words. They learned from the established
press a great deal about mistakes to avoid. The newspaper El Diario, which was one of
the major papers of the capital La Paz and which had supported the government, wrote in
1935 as the Chaco War waned that “it is an axiomatic truth that wars are won not only
with cannon or machine-guns; the artillery of the press and tribunes is as decisive for the
triumph of a cause,

However, Bolivia’s Department of Propaganda had been largely

defensive rather than pro-active, unlike the Paraguayan propaganda offensive that began
early in the conflict and included bringing foreign correspondents to observe frontline
action and producing film of the combat to send worldwide.
Discontented citizens and revolutionaries from all social classes didn t agree with
the perpetuation of the war or support the journalists and newspapers that favored the
government’s actions. However, they did learn a lesson that would help them formulate
the mission they wanted to achieve. Journalists and authors of the new Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario(MNR,National Revolutionary Movement)established a set
of common issues that they hoped would interest citizens around the country. This is
how the struggles of the indigenous, an underrepresented, mistreated majority, became a
national struggle. They also appealed to the desire for better working conditions and a
fairer distribution of wealth. They championed a renewed sense of Bolivian nationalism.
After outlining their mission, they spread propaganda, to rally people around the
idea of fighting for the type of government that they wanted. They established
newspapers and pamphlets and fought to keep these enterprises open as they distributed
their goods as far and wide as possible. Eventually the successful Bolivian national
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revolution became a milestone not only for Bolivia but also all of Latin America. It was
a remedy for many social, cultural and economic concerns that continue to the present
day. Although the revolution didn’t posses the permanency that its perpetrators would
have liked, it did establish a blueprint for how to fight with words as well as arms and
how to appeal to people to gather them around a cause.
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CHAPTER ONE

After the war a coalition of like-minded citizens began to form. It included
journalists and disillusioned youth as well as military men and ordinary citizens; they
were bound by their desire to bring about revolutionary change in Bolivia. In 1936 a
group of young Bolivians formed the newspaper La Calle to help spread their message of
change. They wanted more equal rights for indigenous people and to nationalize the
mines, among other things. Their regard for and use of the press created a strong
foundation for their particular movement in the midst of more unstable actions that had
occurred just before their movement gained traction.
By the end of the Chaco War in 1936, discontent had become so widespread it
seemed to have reached a fever pitch among citizens and members of the Army. Even
before the war had ended, members of the Army had become unhappy with the direction
of the war by President Daniel Salamanca. They replaced him with Vice President Jose
12

Luis Tejada Sorzano.

Some young military officers formed the National Socialist Party

under the leadership of Colonel David Toro, who in May of 1936 defeated Sorzano for
president in national elections.
The overthrow of former president Salamanca was the beginning of a five-year
period of instability marked by a succession of short-time leaders who would die in office
or be overthrown. On July 13, 1937, Lt. Colonel German Busch carried out a coup to
overthrow Toro, a man who Busch had helped become president in the same manner.

7

Although the Busch regime ended with his sudden death in August of 1939, the man and
many of the causes he championed were revered by those young Bolivians who were
working in semi-secrecy in preparation for a more wide-scale revolution. During his
tenure Busch created Bolivia’s first Labor Code and a Ministry of Mines and Petroleum.
He also helped establish a Federation of Miners and restored constitutional government.
In the May 1939 elections a number of people representing the labor movement were
13

elected.

Opponents of Busch’s regime denounced him as a totalitarian and a

demagogue, but to the future leaders of the nationalist party MNR and others who
supported his rule he is a heroic revolutionary figure.
One of Busch’s most trusted advisors was author and activist Gustavo Navarro,
who wrote using the pseudonym Tristdn Marof. Navarro had founded Bolivia’s first
Socialist Party and was a very outspoken proponent for social reform, the rights of
Bolivia’s Indians in particular.^"* Perhaps his most well-known book is Justicia del Inca
(Justice for the Inca), in which the phrase “Mines to the State, Land to the Indian”
became a significant rallying cry for indigenous rights and other generally leftist
policies.' In the new political awareness that developed after the war, Marof also had a
significant role in the establishment of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario(POR,
Revolutionary Worker’s Party).
Other parties formed during this time as well. Some were nationalist in their
ideology and others were leftist and socialist. Perhaps the most influential to the
immediate future of Bolivia was the formation of the MNR in 1941. Its founding
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members were a group of young journalists, economists, and other intellectuals whose
primary focus was to foster Bolivian nationalism. They were also greatly concerned with
issues regarding the labor movement and indigenous rights as well as the social
implications of goals like nationalizing the country’s mines.
Three of its most important founding members were journalists and authors who
brought their literary influence to the party. Carlos Montenegro was a Bolivian author
and journalist who was extremely critical of the country’s major press. He questioned the
impartiality of El Diario, Ultima Hora and La Razon, the newspapers with the largest
circulations and influence. Carlos Victor Aramayo,for example, had controlling interests
in one of the state’s tin mines and also owned La Razon outright. Montenegro questioned
whether the publication could truly report on issues with fairness when its boss was so
strongly tied to the mines’ economic interests. He also said that the newspapers
depended too heavily on the word of Western wire services and that only one of the three
companies’ owners actually lived in or visited the country frequently.

These actions

were contrary to what he thought would help build strong nationalism in the country.
Montenegro’s most significant contribution to the revolution started by the MNR
was his 1943 book Nacionalismo y colonaje (Nationalism and Colonialism). In it he
urged for nationalization of the tin mines and called for greater nationalism from the
country. Montenegro also contributed to the party’s efforts to establish an influential
press system of its own. He was director of the short-lived Semanario Busch in 1941,
which was a weekly paper published as the official voice of the MNR and named for
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former military ruler German Busch. He also contributed articles to La Calle, a paper
founded by the MNR in 1936 that lasted until it was shut down seven years later when
18

General Enrique Penaranda took over military rule of the country.
A second integral founder of the MNR was journalist Armando Arce. After
leaving El Diario in disillusionment, he founded his own independent daily newspaper
called El Universal. It was one of the first revolutionary papers to advocate social and
economic reform. When that publication was closed by the government in 1935 after
three years of existence, Arce and another MNR member named Augusto Cespedes
founded La Calle and contributed articles to it. The name of the newspaper, which
means “the street. symbolized its mission to be involved in the daily activities of the
19

people and to serve as a passageway for people and ideas.
Just as Montenegro often vocally criticized the country’s established press, as
editor of La Calle Arce used print space to give voice to these concerns. Writers never
identified the papers they criticized by name but instead used phrases such as the “the
morning daily of the great mining interests” and “the plutocratic press, The various
military governments that ruled Bolivia before the 1952 revolution viewed La Calle as
the official voice of the MNR. The newspaper suffered frequent police harassment and
temporary closures of their offices.

20

Despite these setbacks. La Calle ran for seven

influential years before it was closed permanently.
The third and perhaps most famous of the three journalists was Augusto
Cespedes. He co-founded La Calle but was more famous for the strong social
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commentaries in his books. He published Sangre de mestizos(Blood of Mixed-Race
People) in 1936, a collection of vignettes about the Chaco War in which he and
Montenegro fought. In the 1946 work Metal del Diablo(The Devil’s Metal), he
criticized tin magnate Simon I. Patino for cruelty and indifference in the way he treated
his workers."
One noticeable omission from the political fervor is the presence of a strong
indigenous voice. While Indians who lived in the urban areas were involved in many of
these parties and those who lived in rural areas had gathered in small union groups, none
of these were as strong or influential an advocate for their concerns as other revolutionary
parties. At the 1938 Constitutional Convention, where the participants ranged from
traditionally conservative parties to revolutionary socialists, a common point of concern
was the “Indian problem,” their social status and lack of opportunity, and its import in
22

building a strong, unified nation,

Without the voices and political influence of those

who actually faced these problems daily, any changes in policy would be subject to the
whims of whoever was in charge at that time and the pulse of public opinion.
In 1940 the Confederacion Sindical de Trabajadores Bolivianos (Sindicated
Confederation of Bolivian Workers)said this about middle- and upper-class intellectuals
joining the cause for indigenous rights: “In Bolivia as in all the world intellectuals have
never demonstrated sincerity, affinity and spirit of fight with the masses...always they try
to take over leadership positions without consulting the base, without identifying with the
„23

base, without sharing its pains, anguish and sense of rebellion.

Indian peasant leader

11

Antonio Alvarez Mamani expressed his dissatisfaction with the place of the Indian in
operating these new groups and political parties. Mamani was invited to a meeting for
one of these fledgling groups in the town of Oruro. Afterwards he said that “we,the
peasants, were supposed to be like spectators in the cinema...without voice or vote,just
„24

as listeners, so that afterwards we would go spread these orders in the countryside.
Despite being somewhat left out of the process, many Indians tried to be engaged
in the political happenings of the time in smaller ways. Indian and peasant leaders
formed activist groups and held small gatherings in their homes in the countryside to
discuss the upheaval in the government as well as ways to effectively spread their
message. One such group was the Bolivian Indigenous Committee. Before the first
National Indigenous Congress in 1945, the Committee created a publication that
circulated throughout the country’s indigenous districts,

It was an eight-page

newspaper seeking delegates to the Congress. Nearly 25,000 copies of the newspaper
were reportedly distributed.
The Indigenous Committee’s bulletin was a concerted effort by its creators to
show a strong sense of nationalism and at the same time push for the rights they sought.
Its cover showed patriotic images such as the portrait of Simon Bolivar, the man who
. It also
helped liberate the country from Spanish colonial rule, and the national emblem
showed a picture of the Indigenous Committee with President Gualberto Villarroel at the
Government Palace in the capital of La Paz.

Major Villarroel, who took over the

government in a 1943 coup, led a ruling coalition that included a right-wing nationalist
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group as well as the MNR. In its pages the bulletin expressed allegiance to Villarroel’s
government, the MNR,and the military as partners because they supported the
indigenous movements for freedom and equality. The newspapers also lamented the
Indian servitude on the latifundios. To the Committee, preventing the Indian from
gaining equal rights hindered the progress of indigenous people as well as the country’s
29

steps toward true nationalism,

Although not all indigenous citizens and peasant leaders

agreed entirely on what actions to take and what benefits to ask of the government, the
desire for equal opportunity and equal rights under the law was paramount.
Overcoming strict regulations by the police campaigns by upset landowners to
paint politically active indigenous people as troublemakers, the government and Indian
supporters from districts around the country held the Congress in May of 1945.
Following discussions and speeches by both Indian and government officials, four
decrees were officially made on the final day of the gathering: suppression of nonagricultural duties that tenants often performed for landowners, abolition of domestic
service requirements for men and women,constmction of schools on rural properties, and
preparation of an agrarian labor code as well as immediate regulations. Although these
issues were important to Indian peasants, the four decrees addressed only a small fraction
of the twenty-seven-point agenda that the Indigenous Committee had created.
There was also disappointment in the lack of specification in the decrees. The call
to build schools on rural properties, for example, did not reference schools specifically
for Indian communities. There was no mention of land redistribution. Furthermore, there
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was little that could be done as far as enforcing the decrees. The National Congress
could not agree on an agrarian labor code, and even if it had adopted a uniform code there
30

was little that it could to do ensure landowners adhered to it.

These shortcomings in

regulation provided uncooperative landowners opportunity to ignore the law and caused
conflict when Indians returned to their homes and attempted to enforce the regulations
themselves with little authority. Still the biggest accomplishment of the Indigenous
Congress was the creation of a network of support for indigenous rights and giving the
government and the MNR the opportunity to align with the indigenous movement.
The results of the Indigenous Congress were generally positive, but the aftermath
of the meeting sparked another round of political and social unrest. Some rural
landowners blamed the unrest on President Villarroel’s support of the laws or accused
government and MNR agents of causing local disturbances. Others blamed the Indian
peasants, saying that workers had adopted “rebellious and insolent attitudes toward their
bosses.

The movement against the Villarroel government and the MNR grew and

culminated in an overthrow of the regime on July 21,1946, by the Frente Democratico
Antifascista(FDA,Democratic Antifascist Front). The FDA was a broad coalition of
liberal, republican and Leftist Revolutionary Party(PIR)politicians that was able to
overthrow this regime without the aide of state police or military. FDA members
opposed Villarroel’s support of pro-Indian initiatives as well as other policies that
increased the role of his administration. Mine owners resented that export earnings had
to be deposited to the Central Bank, and teachers were angry that they received minimal
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raises or none at all because of the government’s conservatism.^" The purpose of this
multi-class coalition was to defend Bolivia from a party they viewed as favoring fascism
over democracy.
The fascist label had been frequently attributed to the MNR ever since its
inception. The international system following World War II provoked a sense of anti
imperialist nationalism in some MNR members, and to a certain extent, there was
sympathy for the Nazi cause. Although the party’s first program contained examples of
questionable anti-Semitism, a racist ideology would conflict with its advocacy for
indigenous rights. In a 1944 speech to the Constituent Assembly, influential member
Victor Paz Estenssoro argued that fascist parties represented “the oppressing classes.” In
Bolivia’s case these classes were the tin magnates and the wealthy landowners. In
«33

Estenssoro’s words the MNR was “a nationalist party, with socialist leanings,

Despite

his words to the contrary, the FDA believed that Paz Estenssoro and his MNR party were
right-wing fascists whose actions were not benefiting the country or its people. During
the following years, the MNR’s role as an unwanted oppositional party challenged the
gains the party had already made as well its ambitions for the future of Bolivia.
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CHAPTER TWO

Villarroers government had become increasingly oppressive during its two-anda-half year span. Far left and far right political groups joined to form the FDA anti
fascist coalition. A popular protest march in July of 1946 turned into the reactive mob
that overthrew the government without military or police force. The press which had
criticized Villarroel for the increasing government presence in business and industry was
extremely proud of the uprising. Days after the coup La Razon wrote that their
newspapermen “were the promoters of the uprising.

were defending liberty of thought

and pointing out the road of rebellion to the people.” Ultima Hora stated, That
movement was prepared by the press.

Because of the many voices who spoke against

Villarroel, it seemed that popular support was in favor of the direction the country was
taking.
The 1946 coup to overthrow the Villarroel government was the beginning of an
especially turbulent six-year period for the country. The fact that Villarroel and several
of his aides were hung from lampposts was perhaps a sign of things to come. Riots and
strikes were frequent in countryside towns. Several regimes tried but were unsuccessful
at installing a permanent regime. When each of these regimes came to power, the MNR
remained as the primary political opposition. Many members were forced into exile. The
party’s newspapers were forced to close. The amount of attention paid to the MNR was a
sign of how influential the party had become among the middle and lower classes.
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Although the hostile political climate made it more difficult for the MNR to operate, the
party persevered until it felt powerful enough to take over the government.
By the next year the FDA government was already facing difficulty in
maintaining its support. The labor movement, which had grown under the MNR and
received great support from the party, began to suffer. This was under the leadership of
the second president of this six-year period Enrique Hertzog, who was the leader of a
group of Republican and socialist parties called the Partido de la Union Republicana
Socialista(PURS). The Patino Mines fired all of its employees. It only rehired workers
who had been “loyal” to the company’s interests. The Miners Federation that had been
established under Germdn Busch was nearly destroyed. In 1949 miners unions declared
a general strike and staged a walkout.”
To his credit President Hertzog did not overturn all of the policies of the former
president and the MNR. He upheld the decrees of the Indigenous Congress and made
promises to enforce them. He also renewed the 1945 Constitution. Although Hertzog
faced criticism, his time as president was relatively benign. He chose to retire due to bad
health in 1949. Vice President Mamerto Urriolagoitia succeeded him. The leftist group
PIR cooperated with the government even though the candidate they had supported in the
1947 elections lost to Hertzog. Several members of the party were still chosen for
Hertzog’s Cabinet. The MNR remained a political enemy.
Many of the party’s most influential leaders lived in exile during the six-year
span. Economist Victor Paz Estenssoro was the de facto leader of the MNR and had
served in Villarroel’s Cabinet. After the overthrow, Estenssoro took refuge in Buenos
Aires, Argentina. Estimates are that nearly five thousand people belonging to the MNR
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or its allies were exiled to Argentina. The government also forced the party to close its
press. In Bolivia’s elections the MNR continued to run candidates. Even though they
had strong support and were often elected, the officials usually were exiled without being
able to serve.** Hoping to capitalize on the labor strikes in rural areas and unrest in the
cities, lesser-known civilian members of the MNR planned to overtake the government
by force. They led a revolt in August and September of 1949 in which rebels temporarily
controlled several cities including Cochabamba,Santa Cruz, and Potosi. The military
quickly regained control, but the event did help renew support for the party. It also
highlighted a divide within the social and political landscape: the MNR,mine workers,
and middle-class supporters against the military and the wealthy elite. Between 1946 and
1952 the MNR carried out twelve attempts to overthrow the government.^
The violence used by the government and military to squash civilian upnsings
only increased tensions that had been created by the struggling economy. The production
from mining and agricultural sectors never completely reached the levels attained before
the depression. Land distribution remained the biggest source of inequality. In a country
roughly three times the size of Montana, only two percent of total land area was being
cultivated on about 86 thousand properties. Some landowners owned multiple properties.
At the same time production remained low or in some instances fell, inflation of currency
began to rise. The cost of living had steadily increased since 1938, but it began to rise
now at a more significant rate. Between 1949 and 1950 the cost of living increased by
201 points.^ The MNR lost much of its right-wing elements during this time and began
to moderate its stance on issues to appeal to the miners, peasants, and the middle class
who were feeling the effects of the stagnating economy the most.
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In the 1951 elections the MNR attempted once more to gain power through
legitimate political means rather than a show of force. There were six candidates who ran
for the office of president. The FDA government nominated politician Gabriel Gos^ves,
who had been the ambassador to Argentina. Other notable candidates were the right-ring
Falange member General Bemadino Bilbao Rioja and La Razon editor Guillermo
Gutierrez Vea-Murguia. The MNR decided to nominate Victor Paz Estenssoro, who still
lived in exile.
After the votes were counted, the results showed that Paz Estenssoro had won the
presidency and that the MNR had gained a majority of offices. The government quickly
nullified the results, however, saying that he had not gained the 51 percent majority
required by the constitution. President Urriolagoitia turned the government over to a
military junta led by General Ballividn Rojas.^ Leaders in the military regime justified
the decision by saying the MNR was affiliated with communism.^ This completely
contradicted the military’s claim that the MNR was fascist in the 1946 coup. Although
the majority of MNR members had adopted more moderate and left-leaning policies since
that overthrow, the communist tag still conflicted with their original ideology. Writers
for La Calle had frequently used editorials to portray radicals and socialists as antiBolivian.^ Estenssoro later commented that members of the party never truly believed
they could seize lasting power through elections. They “considered it necessary and
opportune for the Party to join in the elections because...that would permit a formal
»io

triumph as a step toward a revolutionary seizure of power,

Support for the MNR was

strong following such a blatant injustice.

19

The following year the military junta revealed more cracks in its armor. The
United States announced it was lowering the price it was willing to pay for tin. Although
the junta engaged in negotiations with the U.S., the final price that they agreed upon

was

still much less than the junta had previously demanded. As leader of the regime, General
Rojas made other public mistakes. He made public statements saying the junta might
have to rule for at least two decades, which did not appeal to many citizens or other
political parties. Rojas also publicly feuded with the chief of staff of the army. Parties
from the left and right began plotting ascension to power. Many members of the MNR
felt that the party was well-organized and strong enough to attempt

an overthrow of the

government, and they gained the helped of dissatisfied government minister General
Antonio Seleme.‘‘
On the morning of April 9,1952,in the capital city La Paz, civilians supporting
the MNR and members of the state police under General Seleme’s command led an
armed insurrection against the military junta. Most of the military remained loyal to the
regime. Relatively few civilians were involved in the fighting, which was limited to the
city, so the military was able to hold off their efforts. By the second day. General Seleme
had fled in fear that the movement would fail. That afternoon, however, the tide turned.
Fighting spread to outlying areas like Cochabamba and Potosi. Armed miners were
particularly crucial to the effort. They seized a railroad station above the city and
captured a train storing munitions. In Omro,they encircled the city to prevent potential
reinforcements from gaining access to the capital.*^ Reportedly, even Indian market
women in the capital participated by taking guns from the Indian soldiers guarding it.
On April 11“^ when the final stand by military students supporting the government fell.
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the rebellion was over. Victor Paz Estenssoro was installed as president, and the MNR
was once again in full control of the government.
Almost immediately the party began to institute the social, political and economic
reforms that it had advocated. It dissolved the Army,drastically reduced the size of the
state police and armed its followers in the mining camps and factories. The MNR also
upheld its commitment to Indians. The government created the Ministry of Indian and
Peasant Affairs, whose job was to speak on behalf of the peasants and plan the reforms
that would benefit them economically, socially and politically. It granted universal
suffrage to all adults. Perhaps the biggest accomplishment for the MNR was the
nationalization of the tin industry, a policy which it had adopted in its inception. By
October 3f‘ of that year, the government took control of the Big Three mining
companies and established a Corporacion Minera de Bolivia(Mining Corporation of
Bolivia).

Although these reforms represented great change, the goals of the MNR were

not to change the foundation of Bolivia’s political system and its institutions.
Harsh treatment of oppositional press was one common aspect of all the regimes
that had come to power. The MNR had first-hand knowledge of the difficulties of trying
to maintain a viable press under the government of an opposition leader. During General
Penaranda’s government in 1943,for instance, a governmental decree outlawed
“extremist propaganda” against public order and state institutions or that encouraged
labor unrest. The MNR official paper La Calk was temporarily closed four days later.
Of the three major daily newspapers,El Diario remained silent and Ultima Hora opposed
the measure saying,“In the name of[journalistic] solidarity, we express our objection
against the suspension of an organ of information, because that wounds the very
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institution of the press, La Razon,on the other hand, still remained the party’s harshest
critic and stated that La Calle had “knowingly given occasion” for the shutdown by
criticizing the government,

Ironically, when the MNR assumed power in 1952,they

maintained the practice of suppressing contradictory voices in the press.
Following the armed rebellion, civilian mobs that were angry about La Razon
supporting the previous administrations and the wealthy tin magnates repeatedly accosted
the newspaper’s office. The editor of the paper asked the Minister of Government
several times for police protection but was refused each time. When the newspaper tried
to publish an issue on April 17,just five days after the revolution, mob pressure and
terrorism increased. According to a New York Times article two days later, station
wagons full of men cruised around the newspaper’s editorial offices shouting La Razon
will die! The revolution will live!” In another article from the Times, Estenssoro is
quoted as saying that La Razon was “an enemy of the Bolivian people” and that there

was

no obstacle that prevented the newspaper from publishing although to do so would be like
“waving a red banner before a revolutionary populace which has thus far shown great
restraint.” By June La Razdn officially dismissed its 300 employees and closed down
16

completely.
Another of the newspapers that suffered the most was Los Tiempos located in the
city of Cochabamba. Although it was not affiliated with any of the tin mine owners, it
was still very critical of the MNR government. Editorials openly called for new elections
and criticized nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, and universal suffrage.
Attempting to stop a suspected counter-revolt, mobs seized the printing plant of Los
Tiempos on November 3, 1953. The MNR jailed editor Demetrio Canelas for his part in
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the “subversion." A month later he was released and deported.^^ Several years later
Canelas was granted amnesty and allowed to return to Bolivia, but he was exiled once
again when he petitioned the government for monetary reimbursement for printing
equipment that he claimed had been destroyed. A correspondent for the MNR-controlled
La Nacion who was at the scene refuted this saying that one line casting machine and the
printing press had been damaged but were able to be repaired and sold to other
18

newspapers.
President Estenssoro named Augusto Cespedes editor of the once oppositional
newspaper La Nacion, As director of its content, Cdspedes quickly shifted the focus of
the paper from the status quo to being “socially committed.” This meant openly and
strongly supporting all the government’s actions. The objectivity that the previous
journalists had been criticized for lacking also had no place in the newspaper under the
MNR. In one of his editorials, Cespedes proudly stated, “Revolutionary journalism
wants to be another of the instruments of the Revolution, not only the observer but also
the expression of it” and therefore the newspaper did not have to adhere to an
9

‘objectivity,
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Idol of

The men who ran these revolutionary newspapers unashamedly

affiliated their writings with their cause.
President Estenssoro’s first term from 1952 until 1956 exhibited the most
stringent censorship of oppositional news. The plights of Los Tiempos and La Razon
become more than just a national concern. The Inter American Press Association (lAPA)
was an organization of newspaper publishers, editors and writers who monitored the
ability of the press to operate freely in North and South America. When the group
convened in Mexico City in 1953, they declared that because of the treatment of these
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two newspapers freedom of the press in Bolivia did not exist. The government neither
accepted this condemnation nor agreed to change its actions. Jose Fellmann Velarde
from Bolivia's Ministry of Press, Information and Culture argued that the organization
never condemned the previous “oligarchical regimes” when newspapers critical of the
„20

government were closed and journalists were “killed, imprisoned, tortured and exiled.
Once the MNR had gained stability in their administration, the policies toward
their political opposition including the press began to relax. President Estenssoro had
given partial amnesties to political offenders at some point during each year beginning in
1953. Leading up to the elections in 1956, Estenssoro gave a general amnesty to all
political prisoners in March, and exiles were invited to return. The only political party
that seriously attempted to win the election was the Falange Socialista Boliviana
(Bolivian Socialist Falange), but the MNR was confident that its candidate. Vice
President Hernan Siles, would win. Parties campaigned for their candidates by posting
signs and writing on walls in the cities. The peasants and Indians in the countryside were
still overwhelmingly in support of the MNR. Although Los Tiempos and La Razon

were

not able to reopen, other smaller newspapers expressed their opinions, including those
that opposed the government.^'
After winning the election. President Siles maintained a generally lenient position
toward political opposition. He invited all political exiles to return to the country and
invited opposition members elected to Congress to hold their positions. The opposition
press began to have a stronger voice as well. The Confederation of Peasant Unions
printed a newspaper called Intransigencia that was critical of the government. Daily
newspapers on the Right like Ultima Hora and El Diario were also very critical. El
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Diario grew increasingly angry

with the actions of the Siles administration and called for

policy changes such as the reversal of the nationalization of the tin mines and agrarian
-)*>

reform.""
By \960 when La Razon

and Los Tiempos remained closed, the lAPA still

maintained that freedom of the press in Bolivia was nonexistent. It greatly angered the
government's official newspaper

La Nacidn that the lAPA declared press freedom

existed in Argentina under Arturo Frondizi but not in Bolivia. Two other newspapers
also disagreed with the organization’s declaration. The independent newspaper El
Mundo conceded that press freedom did not exist under Estenssoro’s administration.
However, it argued that even though the government admittedly controlled La Nacidn
and some other newspapers, most were independent or in opposition to the government,
El Pueblo, which was the MNR’s newspaper in Cochabamba, used charges of irony and
hypocrisy by the lAPA to show its objection. It noted that the lAPA meeting was located
in Argentina’s capital city of Buenos Aires and also that Frondizi’s government shut
down La Razon in Buenos Aires and imprisoned its editor on the same day that the
organization gathered.’’ Another positive action was the government’s encouragement of
the unionization of independentjournalists. A union ofjournalists known as the
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Prensa was founded in March 1954.“ Despite this, the
lAPA never reversed its position regarding press freedom during the twelve years the
MNR controlled the government.
Even after the revolution had taken root and the revolutionary press became
established, the government committed to spreading its news and propaganda. Three
governmental agencies were crucial in the effort to spread propaganda. First, the
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Ministry of Education and Fine Arts made the Indian language Quechua a second
national language, which would allow literature to be printed in a language that literate
Indians could understand. The Alcaldia Municipal(City Government) was the second
agency. It published revolutionary documents and other national classics in its series
Bihlioteca Pacena (Library of La Paz). Finally, the Sub-Secretary of Press Information
and Culture (SPIC) published books and other written works as well as documentary
films and radio programs.”*^
Literature and journalism were vital to the revolutionary movement of the MNR.
To an extent, even the oppositional press was important to its movement because
allowing the press to operate freely gave the appearance that the government would truly
be revolutionary and not adopt the same harsh tactics that previous regimes had adopted.
Journalism of all types was generally respected by the MNR government. Still, its
treatment of the oppositional press and their propaganda tactics did have some negative
aspects. For all the party’s messages about creating a democracy in Bolivia, controlling
the press to meet its needs rather than allowing complete freedom showed that part of the
foundation for democracy had still not taken root. This was demonstrated by the military
overthrow of the MNR on November 4,1964. Unhappiness over continuing inflation and
crises in industry were the catalysts. Despite the party’s loss of power,its primary
reforms- nationalization of the tin mines, agrarian reform, and universal suffrage- were
not overturned by the military groups vying for power. The MNR had built strong,
lasting support for itself and their reforms. That was the greatest success of the MNR’s
revolutionary press.
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CHAPTER THREE

There is a long history in Latin America of harsh dictatorships and totalitarian
regimes being overthrown by a coup or some other violent measure. There was the 1910
revolution in Mexico to overthrow dictator Porfirio Diaz. Guatemala in 1944 and Chile
and Nicaragua in the 1970s also had national revolutions. The revolutions in Guatemala
. One
and Chile consisted of a conservative press opposing the revolutionary government
similarity that these examples have with the Bolivian revolution is that the press played
. However,
an important role in helping building support to overthrow the government
there are differences in how these different systems operated.
. Whereas
In Mexico, for example, the press was traditionally very conservative
in Bolivia the press generally favored the tin magnates, the Mexican newspapers tended
to take positions supported by the Catholic Church. Because of censorship in Mexico,
some political exiles lived in the United States and published an anti-government
newspaper called Regeneracion for the Mexican Liberal Party. They had to smuggle the
newspaper back into Mexico for their readers. In the case of Chile, the country s most
influential newspaper El Mercurio called for the military to overthrow socialist Salvador
Allende. The press remained very conservative and strongly in opposition to Allende s
government throughout his tenure. In Nicaragua’s revolution in 1979, the press revolted
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against the Somoza dictatorship. The assassination of the editor of one of the country’s
leading newspapers became a turning point and key to the downfall of the dictatorship.*
The case of the Guatemalan Revolution from 1944 to 1954 provides an interesting
contrast to the Bolivian case. By 1944 Guatemala’s class system and way of governing
had been firmly established. General Jorge Ubico had been dictator for fourteen years
and the ruling elite dominated a large body of peasants and rural Indians. Like the Chaco
War for Bolivia, World War II became a turning point for the middle class in Guatemala.
Many had heard American President Franklin Roosevelt over the radio espousing his
Four Freedoms, which said that all humanity was entitled to freedom of speech and
religion and freedom from want and fear. Middle-class laborers were also inspired by
their northern neighbor Mexico whose president had nationalized the country’s oil
resources, strengthened the labor movement, and enacted land reform law. Teachers
planned a strike on June 29*** to appeal for higher wages, and soon students and others in
the city joined the non-violent movement. In Guatemalan history this was an
unprecedented action against the government, and Ubico did not fully know how to react.
He ordered the cavalry to charge the crowd, resulting in 200 dead civilians.^ When the
country’s most famous journalist was assassinated after speaking before the national
Assembly and publishing anti-government articles in his newspaper El Imparcial, the
revolutionary movement took hold.^
The revolutionaries chose former teacher and exile Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo as their
candidate to run against Ubico’s successor. General Ferderico Ponce,in the March 1945
elections. Arevalo won with overwhelming support from the eligible members of the
populace."* Committing to democracy and social justice, Arevalo set four priorities to
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address during his six-year term. These priorities were: agrarian reform, protection of
labor, improving the educational system, and consolidation of political democracy. Not
only did he encourage the formation of political parties, but Ardvalo also allowed
freedom of speech and the press.

Unfortunately for Arevalo this freedom allowed

newspapers to contribute to the unrest encouraged by his political opponents by the
fourth year of his term. Opposition newspapers criticized the government and its lack of
cohesion on issues as well as the bickering among parties.^ Although violence and unrest
increased over time, press freedom still remained under Arevalo’s democratically-elected
successor. General Jacobo Arbenz.
The Guatemalan government under Ardvalo and Arbenz survived more than thirty
coup attempts by right-wing factions. The most prominent criticism that plagued the
Arbenz regime was that he supported communism, and this is what led the Central
Intelligence Agency of the United States to get involved. This elaborate interference by
the U.S. government included air missions in May and June of 1953 to drop leaflets
throughout the capital warning the army that Arbenz had plans to replace them with a
civilian army and later demanding that Arbenz resign immediately.^ U.S. propaganda
efforts also included placing anonymous articles in Latin American newspapers labeling
●

8

Guatemalan government officials as Communist.
The Guatemalan revolution has interesting similarities and contrasts with the
Bolivian revolution. The MNR came to power in Bolivia as a single party while the
revolutionaries who took office in Guatemala were a group of like-minded individuals
who were not organized into an official party. Another difference is that the MNR
created a press system to challenge conservative regimes, while in Guatemala the
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conservative press and efforts by the CIA were used to discredit the revolutionary
government. Two of the most important similarities between both revolutions reveal why
they initially succeeded and eventually were overthrown. In both countries, supporting
empowerment of the middle and lower classes helped the revolutionary movements build
a strong foundation. They rallied the Indians and peasants and others who were willing
to fight to improve their socioeconomic conditions. A negative similarity between the
two is the lack of cohesion within the governments. The conservative Guatemalan press
used instances of public bickering between government officials to make its case for the
overthrow of the government. In Bolivia, beginning with its association with the
Villaroel regime until the end of its revolution in 1964,the MNR could never completely
consolidate the party. Although the party’s founders had originally been rather moderate,
in later years the party’s ideology ranged from Far Left to Far Right.^ In the end, neither
government could specifically outline its platform. Although this may not have
prevented the military coups that overtook them, it did contribute to the governments’
inability to present a unified counterattack.
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CONCLUSION

The revolutionary press created by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
in Bolivia helped the party assume power during a very turbulent time. The MNR
established its platform around three primary goals. First, it wanted nationalization of the
country's most important resource, the tin mines. Instead of the majority of the
industry’s wealth going to its three wealthy owners, it wanted the money earned from
exports to be used to support the country’s poor masses. Second,it wanted to empower
the country's hard-working and often poor citizens with civil liberties and offer them
more economic opportunity. This included middle-class workers in the cities as well as
peasants and Indians in the rural and remote areas of the country. Indian social and
economic status was particularly important to the party because Indians often were the
poorest, had the least education, and were the most likely to be mistreated. The final
primary goal was to institute agrarian reform. Rights of agricultural workers were
extremely lacking, and land distribution between the wealthy and the middle and lower
classes overwhelmingly favored the wealthy. Although the twelve years of the MNR’s
government was not without crises or failure in some areas, the party did address these
three key issues.
There are three major shortcomings in the execution of the MNR’s messages
through the press. First, is that it never fully incorporated the Indian citizen. Although
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the fight for indigenous rights was a major part of the revolution, Indians had a limited
role. They never had a major voice in the MNR’s newspapers or the political parties
fighting on their behalf. Furthermore, the messages written about them in the newspapers
were tailored more for the educated middle-class than for Indians. Most Indians lived in
the countryside and had little access to La Calle^ La Nacidn and other newspapers written
in the city. Even if Indians had access it was likely that they didn’t know how to read
Spanish or know how to read at all. Another problem was that MNR officials engaged in
the type of government control that they had fought against. When they assumed power,
they limited freedom of the press just like the conservative military regimes before them.
Even though they became more lenient over time, complete fi'eedom never existed under
the MNR government. The animosity between the government and opposition press
contributed to the third problem of danger for journalists. Having the government fight
so strongly with newspaper editors often incited pro-government citizens to take violent
action against journalists and their plants and offices.
These three problems that plagued the revolutionary press were not unique to this
regime, and they persist in Bolivia today. Illiteracy and lack of access still afflict Indians
disproportionately. Many of the country’s 18 daily newspapers are published in the
capital of La Paz. Indians, however, still live primarily in rural areas, and their illiteracy
is a major reason why Bolivia’s overall literacy rate is only 83 percent.*

Radio still

remains the primary source for Indians and many Bolivians to receive the news. In
addition to the divide between the Indian majority and the rest of the country’s citizens in
economic status and education, there is also significant social tension between the two
groups. The 2009 referendum to adopt the new constitution highlighted this divide. Key
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elements for indigenous rights included recognizing the self-determination of 36 distinct
Indian “nations" and designating seats in Congress for minority indigenous groups.'
Following the January 25“" vote, officials reported that the constitution had passed with
about 61.5 percent.^ However,“no” votes were the majority in four of nine states, all of
which were in the relatively prosperous lowlands where opposition to socialist Indian
President Evo Morales is strong."*
Government control of the media is also still an important issue although is not
often as blatant as outright closure. Another provision that was adopted in the new
constitution guaranteed press freedom. There are ambiguous restrictions in several areas
of the law, however. The constitution,for example,says that media must “respect the
principles of truth and responsibility.”'^ The current Penal Code also threatens journalists
and citizens who “defame or insult” public officials with the punishment of being jailed.^
Morales’ administration also strictly monitors media, which he feels favors business and
special interests in its coverage. In 2007 a presidential aide reported to the Committee to
Protect Journalists that Morales told members of his cabinet to hire advisors to monitor
television and radio news programs to make sure the government’s point-of-view was
presented.^ Unsurprisingly, the government reserves the right to withhold information
from the media about any topic.
Finally,journalists in Bolivia who speak out against the government or other
powerful groups face a multitude of dangers. As recently as 2007, the Committee to
Protect Journalists ranked Bolivia as one of the most dangerous places to practice
journalism. In 2000, for example, the staff at the daily newspaper La Presencia received
death threats and a bomb scare after it investigated a major drug trafficking story.^ The
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group Association of Journalists of La Paz has documented more than twelve violent
attacks by pro-government supporters since Morales took office in January of 2006.
Journalists have fallen victim to anti-government groups as well.^ Despite these dangers,
many journalists are committed to their roles as government watchdogs and to protecting
their rights from abuses. Several newspapers have also made efforts to inform citizens
about civic responsibility and their rights to free information.
The fact that the press of the MNR fell into these familiar patterns of operation
deserves criticism and analysis, but it does not completely detract from the
accomplishments the party made. Although the election results of 1951 were nullified, it
was still a milestone because the Bolivian people’s voice was heard because of the
democratic concept of voting. The coup that the MNR orchestrated was a continuation of
a movement to take back control of the government for the people. Years later, the voice
of the people is still being heard through uncompromised elections. As
telecommunications capabilities improve, Bolivia’s media will be a vital part of the
country moving forward so long as they continue to offer socially relevant content.
Although there are still many social and economic hurdles to overcome,the improved
future that many Bolivians look forward to is the same one that the leaders of the MNR
wanted as well.
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